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1. Introduction 
In October 2018, the mayor of Riace, a small Italian town in southern Italy, was put 
under house arrest over claims that he had set up an illegal operation to prevent asylum 
seekers being deported. In the years before his arrest, Mayor Domenico Lucano had 
gained international fame for welcoming hundreds of refugees to Riace. Prosecutors 
issued a statement saying that their investigation had brought to light ‘the unscrupu-
lousness of Mr Lucano, despite his institutional role’, in organising marriages of con-
venience between Riace citizens and asylum seekers, to secure the latter's stay in Italy. 
Civil society organisations expressed concern about the arrest, and anti-mafia writer 
Roberto Saviano wrote in a Facebook post that the goal of Lucano's actions was ‘not 
profit, but civil disobedience’ and that this was ‘the only weapon we have to defend 
not only the rights of migrants, but everyone’s’.1 Another writer, Gioacchino Criaco, 
said Lucano was an honest man but that the ‘rules on the reception and management 
of migrants are too tangled, and administrators often find themselves caught in a di-
lemma between a humanitarian choice and a legal one’.2 
During her long and extremely productive academic career, Elspeth Guild has pu-
blished on law and law making processes in the field of migration and asylum at a 
variety of levels and in a variety of arenas, critically examining the role of a wide variety 
of actors – state and non-state, national, supranational and intergovernmental actors – 
involved in these processes. In this contribution, we will focus on an actor which, as 
far as we have been able to establish, has more or less escaped Elspeth Guild’s atten-
tion. We will examine how mayors in the Netherlands perceive and use their discretion 
in situations involving rejected asylum seekers or other migrants whom the national 
government considers to be ‘unlawfully present aliens’.  
In several European countries, mayors have stood up for (rejected) asylum seekers. 
The position of mayors in different countries differs and so do their formal and infor-
mal powers and competences. In Italy, mayors are elected and enjoy large autonomy 
and independence. In the Netherlands, mayors are appointed by the national govern-
ment. They are not as autonomous and independent vis-à-vis the national government 
as elected mayors. However, they too may be required to decide about offering support 
to rejected asylum seekers. 
                                                        
*  Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands. 
1  Ylenia Gostoli, ‘Italy's pro-refugee mayor Domenico Lucano arrested’, Al Jazeera News, 2 October 
2018. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com. 
2  ‘Pro-refugee Italian mayor arrested for “aiding illegal migration”’, The Guardian 2 October 2018. Re-
trieved from https://www.theguardian.com. 
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In 2018, the expulsion of Afghan asylum seekers to their country of origin led to societal unrest 
in Tytsjerksteradiel, a village in the north of the Netherlands and the location of a reception 
centre for rejected asylum seekers. The municipal council and several NGOs urged the mayor 
to refuse to cooperate with the expulsions. Mayor Jeroen Gebben responded that he would be 
exceeding or abusing his discretion if he did so, because the matter fell within the competence 
of the national government.3 
 
There have also been cases where mayors in the Netherlands helped rejected asylum 
seekers to go into hiding to prevent their expulsion, or where they instructed the police 
not to cooperate in an expulsion.  
 
In 2012, Mayor Els Boot (Giessenlanden) instructed the police not to provide assistance in the 
expulsion of an Afghan asylum seeker. She said she feared disastrous consequences for his wife 
and children if the man was expelled. ‘As a mayor, I am bound by my duty of care for every 
resident in my municipality. I cannot stand by and watch the drama unfold if I can prevent it’, 
she stated. 
 
Mayors apparently have different perceptions of their discretion or, in terms of Dwor-
kin’s hole-in-the-doughnut analogy, different ideas about the content and tightness of 
the ‘belt of restriction’ surrounding their discretion. In this contribution, we will exa-
mine how mayors in the Netherlands have responded to two types of situations invol-
ving rejected asylum seekers or other unlawfully present migrants:  
1.  Mayors may be asked (by local actors like members of the municipal council, 
NGOs or individual citizens) to resist the expulsion of unlawfully present migrants. 
This often concerns (families with) children who have grown up in the Nether-
lands. 
2. Mayors may be asked to provide shelter and other forms of support to unlawfully 
present migrants who cannot be expelled and who have been found living on the 
street or causing a public nuisance. 
 
In both situations, mayors are asked to act against or depart from the policies of the 
national government. How do they respond? Do they take action, and if yes, what types 
of action, and how do they justify their responses? Do they consider them as falling 
within their discretionary space? In brief, how do mayors perceive, define and use their 
discretion? As we are interested in how mayors perceive their discretion, we do not 
distinguish beforehand between weak and strong discretion, or between discretion and 
autonomy.4 To use once more Dworkin’s hole-in-the-doughnut analogy, we assume 
                                                        
3  ‘Wat kan de gemeente doen tegen uitzettingen van afgewezen asielzoekers?’, Friesch Dagblad 18 August 
2018. Retrieved from https://frieschdagblad.nl. 
4  The concept discretion has been defined in different ways. According to Van Leeuwen, Tummers & 
Van der Walle (2017, p. 2), ‘discretion can be broadly conceptualized as decision-making power over 
sort, quantity, and quality of sanctions and rewards during policy implementation’. According to Evans 
& Harris (2004, p. 871, 881), ‘discretion should be regarded as a series of gradations of freedom to 
make decisions’. See also Eule (2014, p. 57), commenting on Lipsky’s (1980, 2010) distinction between 
discretion and autonomy. 
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that mayors may have different ideas about both the content (they may refer to diffe-
rent sets of rules) and the tightness (they may see more or less room for manoeuvre) 
of the ‘belt of restriction’ surrounding their discretion. 
To answer the above questions, we analysed newspaper reports of local cases that 
occurred in the years 2011-2018. We conducted a search of all Dutch news in Lexis 
Nexis, an online database of newspaper articles, using the search terms burgemeester* 
AND uitgeprocedeerd*. This yielded 551 results. After excluding double hits5, we had 361 
results left. Further selection was done by reading the articles: 295 articles turned out 
to be relevant. Next, 16 more relevant articles were found by way of the snowball me-
thod and a Google search.6 All in all, we analysed 311 newspaper articles. Moreover, 
we interviewed four mayors. One of them had also been chair of the committee for 
asylum affairs of the Association of Netherlands Municipalities. Another one had also 
been the responsible minister for some years.  
2. Backgrounds 
In the Netherlands, mayors (burgemeesters) are the head of the municipal government. 
There are 355 municipalities in the Netherlands. They are responsible for various pu-
blic services. The mayor chairs both the municipal council, whose members are elected 
by the general populace, and the council of mayor and aldermen (College van B&W), 
which is the executive board of the municipality. The members of this executive all 
have their own portfolio. The mayor’s portfolio always includes public order and safety. 
Whereas the aldermen are elected and can be voted out by the municipal council, the 
mayor is appointed by the national government and therefore cannot be removed from 
his office by the municipal council. Nearly all mayors are members of political parties, 
but they are expected to be impartial. Mayors are responsible for public order and safety 
in the municipality. For this purpose, they have authority over the police. They cannot 
be instructed about the use of their powers in this respect by the municipal council, 
they can only be called to account about their actions afterwards.7 
Although there has been a trend toward decentralising powers from the national 
government to the municipalities, powers and competences in the field of migration 
and asylum law have remained with the national government. Over the past decades, 
the treatment of rejected asylum seekers has been a continuous matter of debate bet-
ween the national government and municipalities. Under the Aliens Act 2000, rejected 
asylum seekers are obliged to leave the country and their entitlement to reception ends 
four weeks after their asylum application has been turned down. In practice, however, 
many do not voluntarily leave and are not forcibly expelled either. Some of them end 
up on the streets in municipalities. Municipalities are responsible for providing social 
support, but the so-called Linking Act, which entered into force in 1998, prohibits 
them from providing support to unlawfully present aliens.8 The municipalities (through 
                                                        
5  If the same article was published in different newspapers with joint editorial offices, we selected the 
article in the main journal. When an article with the same title was published twice in the same news-
paper, we selected the longest version. 
6  We thank Mienke de Wilde for searching and selecting relevant articles. 
7  Voermans & Waling 2018, p. 106. 
8  Pluymen 2008, p. 36. 
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the Association of Netherlands Municipalities, of which all municipalities are members, 
and LOGO, a platform of municipalities which offer shelter to rejected asylum seekers) 
argue that rejected asylum seekers should be offered reception facilities until their de-
parture or expulsion, to prevent problems in the field of public order and safety and 
public health. Moreover, they argue that if the national government does not take its 
responsibility in this respect, municipalities are allowed or even obliged to provide at 
least a minimal form of shelter, often referred to as ‘bed, bath and bread’.9 The national 
government wants the municipalities to stop providing shelter as it will encourage re-
jected asylum seekers to stay in the country unlawfully.10 
Another disagreement concerned the authority over the police in relation to expul-
sions of rejected asylum seekers. Whereas the national government took the position 
that the authority lies with the minister of Justice and Security, many mayors thought 
they could instruct the police not to provide assistance with an expulsion to prevent 
public unrest in their municipality.11 In 2012, forty mayors signed a letter in which they 
supported the refusal of Mayor Els Boot to call in the police for the expulsion of an 
Afghan asylum seeker.12 The mayors argued that the minister’s interpretation of the 
Police Act was incorrect. The minister then commissioned an expert opinion from legal 
scholars. They concluded that the authority over the police in relation to expulsions lay 
exclusively with the minister, and that save in very exceptional circumstances, mayors 
could not forbid the police to assist with expulsions.13  
The municipalities also called for a regularisation scheme for asylum seekers who 
had been in the country for many years. In 2007, after years of discussion, the national 
government agreed to a one-off regularisation scheme, the so-called Pardonregeling (am-
nesty scheme), on condition that the municipalities would stop offering shelter to re-
jected asylum seekers who did not fulfil the conditions of the scheme. In 2013, again 
under pressure from, among others, municipalities, the national government agreed to 
a special regularisation scheme for long-term resident children, the Kinderpardon (child-
ren’s amnesty scheme). In January 2019, the government agreed to loosen the condi-
tions of the scheme. 
The municipalities have thus achieved some successes. However, the problem of 
rejected asylum seekers ending up on the streets in municipalities has not been solved; 
it has remained a bone of contention between the national government and municipa-
lities. The national government has used a variety of means and arguments to persuade 
municipalities to stop providing shelter to rejected asylum seekers, from emphasising 
the importance of uniform government action and denying mayors’ discretionary po-
wers in these matters to threatening municipalities with financial penalties.  
The national government does not exclude rejected asylum seekers entirely from 
reception facilities. An exception is made for families with minor children. They are 
                                                        
9  Cf. Kos, Maussen & Doomernik 2015, p. 9. 
10  ACVZ 2012, 2018; Winter et. al. 2018. 
11  ACVZ 2012. 
12  Rob Pietersen, ‘Burgemeester belet uitzetting Afghaan’, Trouw 27 March 2012. Retrieved from 
https://www.trouw.nl; ‘40 burgemeesters tegen uitzetten’, Binnenlands Bestuur 1 April 201). Retrieved 
from https://www.binnenlandsbestuur.nl. 
13  Advies van prof. mr. dr. J.G. Brouwer en prof. mr. dr. A.E. Schilder inzake ‘het gezag over de politie 
bij uitzetting van vreemdelingen’ van 24 september 2012 (bijlage bij 19637, nr.1588). Retrieved from 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/blg-191055. See also Brouwer & Schilder 2012. 
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entitled to reception in special family centres. Other rejected asylum seekers are offered 
reception in a special centre, with a freedom-restricting regime, for a maximum of 
twelve weeks, under the condition that they cooperate with their expulsion. In 2014, 
the European Committee for Social Rights (ECSR) ruled that the Dutch government 
had violated its obligations under the European Social Charter by refusing reception 
facilities to rejected asylum seekers and other unlawfully present migrants.14 According 
to the ECSR, the provision of emergency assistance could not be made conditional 
upon the willingness of the persons concerned to cooperate in the organisation of their 
own expulsion. This judgment led to a period of legal uncertainty, as the government 
indicated that it would not comply with the ruling and the Committee of Ministers of 
the ECSR was vague about whether unlawfully present migrants fell within the scope 
of the Charter. In 2015, the two highest administrative courts in the Netherlands ruled 
that the government might make the provision of reception facilities to rejected asylum 
seekers conditional upon their cooperation with their expulsion.15 In 2016, another 
judgment was passed by the Judicial Division of the Council of State, stating that mu-
nicipalities had no specific power to provide shelter to unlawfully present migrants and 
that there was no legal or international duty upon municipalities to do so. The highest 
administrative court thus departed from the ECSR.16  
In the meantime, deliberations between the national government and the munici-
palities continued, and in November 2018, a new agreement was reached. In five large 
municipalities, reception facilities for rejected asylum seekers will be opened. The re-
sults will be evaluated after three years and if the reception facilities lead to more vo-
luntary departures, another three facilities will be opened. Both the national govern-
ment and the municipalities will contribute financially.  
3. Legal and Moral Arguments for Taking Action on Issues Involving Rejected 
Asylum Seekers 
Municipalities are a decentralised tier of the government, and as heads of these decen-
tralised governments, mayors are bound to follow the laws and policies of the national 
government. It is the national government, more specifically the state secretary of Jus-
tice and Security, that decides whether a country is safe to return to for migrants who 
are not allowed to stay in the Netherlands. Mayors are expected to follow the national 
government in this regard. As Kos et al. pointed out, from the viewpoint of the national 
government, municipalities are formally a ‘chain partner’ or a ‘cooperation partner’ 
when they provide space or land for the reception centres that are owned and run by 
the national government, but ‘they are expected to be ‘cooperative’ when it comes to 
other aspects of policy implementation for which they take no formal responsibility’.17  
                                                        
14  Conference of European Churches (CEC) v. the Netherlands (decisions on the merits), Complaint No. 
90/2013, Council of Europe: European Committee of Social Rights, 10 November 2014.  
15  CRvB 26 November 2015, ECLI:NL:CRVB:2015:3834; ABRvS 26 November 2015, 
ECLI:NL:RVS:2015:3415. See also Terlouw 2016, p. 4. 
16  ABRvS 29 juni 2016, ECLI:NL:RVS:2016:1782 and ECLI:NL:RVS:2016:1783. 
17  Kos, Maussen & Doomernik 2015, p. 362. 
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The Dutch aliens law grants hardly any discretion to mayors when it comes to 
providing police assistance in cases of expulsion and refusing shelter to unlawfully pre-
sent migrants. Nevertheless, mayors could in theory find at least three types of argu-
ments in the law to argue that it falls within their discretion to refuse police assistance 
or to (continue to) provide shelter:  
• Firstly, mayors could argue that the municipality’s duty of care toward vulnerable 
people, as laid down in the Social Support Act (Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning), 
and their responsibility for public order and safety allows or even obliges them to 
act.18 Particularly with regard to offering shelter, mayors could argue that they ex-
ercise their powers in the field of public order and security reasonably if offering 
shelter prevents people from wandering around, destitute, on the streets.19  
• Secondly, mayors could argue that they have an independent responsibility to pro-
tect human rights as laid down in international treaties, such as the right to human 
dignity in Art. 1 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the right of non-
refoulement of Art. 33 of the Refugee Convention. In 2012, the Association of Neth-
erlands Municipalities together with the Dutch section of Amnesty International 
published a brochure on the meaning of human rights for municipalities. Accord-
ing to this brochure, both national and local governments and individual govern-
ment officials have the responsibility to respect, protect and promote human rights 
as formulated in human rights treaties and the Constitution. Moreover, the Neth-
erlands has a monist system: Arts. 93 and 94 of the Dutch Constitution determine 
that international law provisions have preference above national laws.20 
• Thirdly, mayors could refer to inconsistent jurisprudence. For example, with regard 
to offering shelter, there was a period of diverging case law after the judgment of 
the European Committee for Social Rights. Mayors who decided to support un-
lawfully present migrants, could thus argue that they were not acting contra legem, 
but in conformity with legal obligations resting on them. 
 
Our newspaper search and interviews with mayors did not yield clear examples of 
mayors using the latter two arguments. Of course, these arguments may well have been 
used in, e.g., letters to the state secretary, but we did not find them in interviews given 
to journalists. Among the four mayors we interviewed, one mayor did refer to ‘funda-
mental human rights’ and ‘people’s right to a dignified treatment’, but he had doubts 
about using them as a basis for concrete action.21  
We did find many examples of the first argument, i.e. mayors arguing that their 
responsibility for public order and safety allowed or obliged them to act. 
 
In 2015, Mayor Frits Naafs (Utrechtse Heuvelrug) claimed that he had the authority to offer 
shelter to rejected asylum seekers – to prevent them falling into anonymity, illegality and 
criminality – as the reception of homeless people fell within his competence. This would not be 
necessary if the national government ensured that rejected asylum seekers did not stay here 
unlawfully, he stated.22 
                                                        
18  Zwaan & Minderhoud 2016, p. 897; De Jong et. al. 2017.  
19  ACVZ 2018, Bijlage 1; ACVZ 2012. 
20  Goed bezig. De betekenis van mensenrechten voor gemeenten 2012. 
21  Interview M2 (2018, November 23). 
22  Naafs blijft asielzoekers steunen (2015, April 30). Retrieved from https://nieuwsbladdekaap.nl. 
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All four mayors we interviewed stated that their responsibility for public order and 
safety gave them discretion to take action for rejected asylum seekers. However, two 
of them added that this discretion was sometimes misused or improperly used by col-
leagues. The first mayor considered refusing police assistance for expulsions to be ‘im-
proper use of the powers mayors have for the purpose of protecting public order, in 
cases when the public order is not at stake’.23 The second mayor stated that mayors 
sometimes ‘choose the easy route’ by supporting protests against an asylum seeker’s 
expulsion, as the final decision did not lie with them, but with the state secretary. In 
this respondent’s view, ‘it is easy to claim that you have discretion if the final respon-
sibility for the bigger issue does not lie with you’.24 The third mayor stated that nearly 
all laws and regulations contained ‘a safety net’, i.e. provisions that made it possible to 
deviate from the letter of the law if the spirit of the law required it.25 The mayors talked 
about their discretionary space in a rather loose way, without referring to specific pro-
visions or laws or regulations. The fourth mayor explained that he thought he had a 
large discretionary space but would rather not know if it was not as large as he thought, 
and that he would use it anyway.26 
Some mayors are prepared to act (or accept that they may act) contra legem when 
supporting rejected asylum seekers. These mayors invoke different arguments. Our 
newspaper search yielded examples of four types of arguments. 
• Mayors may experience the legal norms as unjust or in contradiction with moral 
norms such as the right to have rights,27 or religious norms such as ‘love your 
neighbour like you love yourself’. 
• They may regard national policies vis-à-vis rejected asylum seekers as failing and 
argue they have to step in where the national government fails to take responsibil-
ity. They may also think that municipalities are best aware of and best equipped to 
solve problematic situations involving rejected asylum seekers.  
• They may feel they have a special responsibility toward rejected asylum seekers in 
their municipality, which may be strengthened by pleas from schools, neighbours, 
football clubs, etcetera, that claim that the migrants concerned have become part 
of the community.  
• They may not agree with the decision that was made in the refugee status determi-
nation procedure and/or with the expulsion decision. 
 
The first three arguments are most common and they are often combined. The follo-
wing example is interesting because the mayor concerned differentiated between law 
and policy.  
 
In the context of the debate on reception facilities for rejected asylum seekers, Mayor Annemarie 
Penn-te Strake (Maastricht) said she did not have a problem with acting contrary to national 
policies ‘if the interest of the person concerned serves a higher purpose than the implementation 
of policies that lead to distressing situations. That is the space I take, it is not my job to look 
                                                        
23  Interview M1 (2018, November 19). 
24  Interview M2 (2018, November 23). 
25  Interview M3 (2018, November 28). 
26  Interview M4 (2019, February 15). 
27  Arendt 1968, p. 177.  
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away’, she said. However, she differentiated between law and policies. She would not be prepared 
to break the law, except in the extreme case that by doing so she could save a human life, and 
she would resign immediately afterward.28  
 
In 2016, Mayor Jos Heijmans (Weert) helped a Syrian asylum seeker and her four young children 
to hide in a monastery to prevent their expulsion to Germany (and prevent them being separated 
from relatives in the Netherlands). ‘I let my heart prevail over the rules’, he explained, and: ‘As 
a mayor, you have to intervene when people fall victim to the rules.’29 
 
All four mayors we interviewed were of the opinion that there are situations where it 
might be necessary to exceed one’s discretionary powers and/or to break the law. ‘Ne-
cessity knows no law’, the first respondent said, and: ‘Conscience, not law, is the highest 
norm for me.’ However, he added that he would go that far only in ‘cases of life and 
death’.30 The second respondent referred to ‘fundamental human rights’ and ‘people’s 
right to a dignified treatment’.31 The third respondent said that mayors often acted 
without formal power or authority, ‘because as a mayor, you want to solve problems’. 
He did not feel the need to justify his actions by referring to the law: ‘I feel I’m autho-
rised to do what I deem necessary if the national government does not perform its 
duties properly.’ In his view, if people were not granted a residence permit they should 
be expelled, and if they could not be expelled they should be granted reception. ‘You 
cannot just accept that people fall between two stools. That is inhuman.’32 The fourth 
respondent likewise described himself as a problem solver, but he also referred to the 
Second World War to explain why he felt authorised to do what he deemed necessary 
to prevent people from living on the streets.33 
4. Choices and Justifications 
In our newspaper search, we found a large variety of actions taken by mayors to sup-
port rejected asylum seekers. With regard to resisting deportations, actions taken ran-
ged from writing letters to the state secretary to withholding police assistance for re-
moving rejected asylum seekers from their houses and helping families to hide. With 
regard to offering shelter, we found a series of joint (public) lobbying activities by 
mayors, aimed at changing national policies. But we also found a range of actions to 
support rejected asylum seekers in the municipality concerned, for example by provi-
ding shelter to specific groups of vulnerable rejected asylum seekers; providing shelter 
for a specific period of time (e.g., one month or in wintertime); permitting a tent camp 
                                                        
28  Marten Muskee (2018, June 1). Burgemeester Annemarie Penn-te Strake van Maastricht: ‘We mogen 
soms wel iets dapperder zijn’. Retrieved from https://vng.nl.  
29  Burgemeester Weert: ‘Onderduiken hielp voor Syrisch gezin’ (2018, September 3). Retrieved from 
https://www.nporadio1.nl. 
30  Interview M1 (2018, November 19). 
31  Interview M2 (2018, November 23). 
32  Interview M3 (2018, November 28). 
33  Interview M4 (2019, February 15). 
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and offering bins and mobile toilets;34 terminating reception facilities but offering mo-
ney to the migrants concerned;35 providing financial support to NGOs that offered 
shelter. 
Mayors make different choices with regard to what actions to take. Some mayors 
offer actual support to rejected asylum seekers, others try to convince the state secre-
tary to use his discretionary power. Some participate in joint (public) lobbying efforts 
aimed at changing policies, others prefer to conduct silent diplomacy for asylum see-
kers in their municipality.36  
 
Mayor Jeroen Gebben (Tytsjerksteradiel) said he used ‘silent diplomacy’ to prevent the expulsion 
of Afghan asylum seekers. However, going against the policy of the national government was 
not his style: ‘This mayor will not resort to administrative disobedience, I have been appointed 
by the government.’37  
 
In 2014, Mayor Harald Bergmann (Middelburg) asked the state secretary to grant residence 
permits to an asylum seeker family with children. The family’s application for residence permits 
under the children’s regularisation scheme had been rejected. The same mayor had refused to 
sign a letter in which (over 300) mayors had urged the state secretary to extend the children's 
regularisation scheme.38 The mayor explained that signing that letter would have been a political 
act which did not suit a mayor.39  
 
If mayors are prepared to take action in individual cases, their choices with regard to 
whom to support do not differ that much. Proximity plays a role in the sense that 
mayors may feel they have a special responsibility toward rejected asylum seekers in 
their own municipality. Political philosophers have pointed to the arbitrariness of 
proximity as an argument for responsibility (of states for refugees), but they hold that 
migrants must be offered the opportunities of citizenship once they have been taken 
in. Presence on the territory is regarded by them as a basis for membership of the 
community.40 In actual life, whether rejected asylum seekers in a municipality are re-
garded as members (or as deserving membership) of the community depends on their 
integration.  
                                                        
34  In 2013, Mayor Eberhard van der Laan (Amsterdam) legitimised his decision to permit a tent camp 
by stating that he regarded it as a demonstration; the decision to provide bins and mobile toilets was 
legitimised referring to public health and public order. 
35  Hanne Obink, ‘225 euro rijker, maar opnieuw op straat’, Trouw 31 May 2013. Retrieved from 
https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:58J5-D9F1-JC8W-
Y00H-00000-00&context=1516831. 
36  Cf. Van der Leun & Bouter 2015, p. 149. 
37  ‘Wat kan de gemeente doen tegen uitzettingen van afgewezen asielzoekers?’, Friesch Dagblad 18 August 
2018. Retrieved from https://frieschdagblad.nl. 
38  ‘Oproep burgemeesters aan staatssecretaris Teeven’ (2014, May 21). Retrieved from http://www.logo-
gemeenten.nl/dossier-kinderpardon. 
39  ‘Burgemeester op de bres voor asielzoekersgezin’ (2014, June 6). Retrieved from https://www.om-
roepzeeland.nl. 
40  Walzer (1983, p. 62) states that ‘every new immigrant, every refugee taken in, every resident and worker 
must be offered the opportunities of citizenship.’ Miller (2016, p. 83-84) sees proximity (presence on 
the territory) as one of the bases for responsibility for refugees. See also Gibney (2004, p. 31) on 
membership and identity. 
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This is illustrated by the aforementioned letter of appeal, in which over 300 mayors had urged 
the state secretary to extend the children's regularisation scheme. The concluding sentence was: 
‘For the municipalities, these children already are well integrated citizens of their town or village. 
It would be good to formalise this by granting real residence permits.’41 
 
Cases of children who grew up in the Netherlands (the Dutch speak of them as being 
‘rooted’) have also been prominent in the media. In several cases, the state secretary 
ultimately decided to use his discretionary power and grant residence permits. More 
generally, visibility and the circumstance of a neighbourhood, school, community stan-
ding up for the migrants concerned, may help to prevent their expulsion.42  
All four mayors we interviewed had written letters to the state secretary for rejected 
asylum seekers in their municipality, in most or some cases with success, they said. One 
respondent explained that he only wrote such letters for asylum seekers who were well 
integrated, working or studying and participating in the local society. Moreover, they 
had to be of irreproachable conduct. Later on he added that he also found it relevant 
if people were traumatised and vulnerable.43 Another respondent explained that he had 
once made his support conditional on the migrant concerned improving his Dutch 
language proficiency, because otherwise he could not credibly argue that the migrant 
(who had been living in the municipality for eighteen years) was well integrated in the 
community.44 The third respondent explained that he had to be convinced that the 
decision deserved reconsideration because there were special circumstances that had 
not been taken into account when the asylum application was rejected. The same res-
pondent was critical about ‘some colleagues who too easily say yes when they are asked 
to write a letter’, thereby shirking their responsibility and passing the buck to the se-
cretary of state. However, he also thought that mayors should get a larger say in deci-
sion-making processes about rejected asylum seekers. He called it ‘completely ridicu-
lous’ that the national government claimed to be in a better position to assess the situ-
ation of a rejected asylum seeker who was living in a municipality than the municipality 
concerned.45 The fourth mayor described one situation in which he would have liked 
to have had the state secretary’s discretionary power. It concerned a vulnerable rejected 
asylum seeker who had lived for years with a private person, an inhabitant of the town 
who had offered him shelter.46 
                                                        
41  ‘Oproep burgemeesters aan staatssecretaris Teeven’ (2014, May 21). Retrieved from http://www.logo-
gemeenten.nl/dossier-kinderpardon. 
42  Schrover (2018, p. 459) speaks of a ‘restrictionist paradox’: voters vote for a restrictive policy, but 
protest against deportations of those who have been given a face. 
43  Interview M3 (2018, November 28). 
44  Interview M4 (2019, February 15).  
45  Interview M2 (2018, November 19). This was also proposed by the Advisory Committee on Aliens 
Affairs (ACVZ) in 2011. The committee pointed at the German example of the Härtefall Kommissionen, 
which consisted of representatives from the relevant state ministries, local authorities, regional and 
local civil society organisations and a single independent member. The ACVZ advised setting up a 
similar advisory body in the Netherlands, to examine from various perspectives cases in which the use 
of discretionary powers was requested on the basis of exceptional circumstances (ACVZ 2011, p. 65). 
46  Interview M1 (2018, November 19). 
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5. Concluding Remarks  
Mayors can, to a certain extent, be compared to street-level bureaucrats. Like street-
level bureaucrats, they have more proximity than the policymakers at the national level 
to the people targeted by the policies. Like them, they have a certain amount of discre-
tion and they may select between ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ rejected asylum seekers. 
However, unlike street-level bureaucrats, mayors do not implement law and policies as 
a primary task. Moreover, they do not have the task of applying rules to individual 
cases.  
Many mayors are confronted with rejected asylum seekers living in their municipa-
lity, and with requests to support them. Dutch aliens law gives mayors little or no for-
mal discretion as regards resisting expulsions or offering shelter, but they can derive 
room for manoeuvre from other national laws, in particular the Municipalities Act (Ge-
meentewet) and the Social Support Act, and international human rights law. Mayors who 
refer to the law and their formal discretion, mostly refer to their responsibility for pu-
blic order in their municipality as laid down in the Municipalities Act. Other mayors 
(or the same mayors in different situations) accept that they may be exceeding their 
discretion when supporting rejected asylum seekers. The vague nature of what mayors’ 
discretion exactly entails explains partly why we see differences between mayors in their 
approaches to problems involving unlawfully present migrants and in their perceived 
discretion in this regard.  
Another explanation can be found in the specificities and complexities of the po-
licy domain concerned. Expulsion sometimes proves to be hardly possible. The idea 
that people whose claim for a residence status has been rejected will leave the country 
is largely a fiction and it is the municipalities (and mayors) who are confronted with the 
consequences of the failing expulsion policy. In addition, both expulsion and refusing 
reception touch upon basic human rights, which makes the issue very sensitive. Mayors 
can therefore hardly stay neutral, and doing nothing is also a decision. Moreover, quite 
a few mayors disagree with national policies especially when it concerns the expulsion 
of children who were born and raised in the Netherlands, or refusing shelter to people 
who have not been deported.  
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